Von Stefan Sasse
|Brit. Außenminister Halifax 1937|
Im British War Bluebook, in dem das fragliche Dokument verzeichnet ist, findet sich folgende Analyse Hendersons, die dieser an das britische Außenministerium weiterleitete:
I TOLD Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty's Government found it difficult to advise Polish Government to accept procedure adumbrated in German reply, and suggested that he should adopt normal contact, i.e., that when German proposals were ready to invite Polish Ambassador to call and to hand him proposals for transmission to his Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations. I added that if basis afforded prospect of settlement His Majesty's Government could be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw to temporize negotiations.
2. Herr von Ribbentrop's reply was to produce a lengthy document which he read out in German aloud at top speed. Imagining that he would eventually hand it to me I did not attempt to follow too closely the sixteen or more articles which it contained. Though I cannot therefore guarantee accuracy the main points were: restoration of Danzig to Germany; southern boundary of Corridor to be line Marienwerder, Graudenz, Bromberg, Schönlanke; plebiscite to be held in the Corridor on basis of population on 1st January, 1919, absolute majority to decide; international commission of British, French, Italian and Russian members to police the Corridor and guarantee reciprocal communications with Danzig and Gdynia pending result of the plebiscite; Gydnia to be reserved to Poland; Danzig to be purely commercial city and demilitarised.
3. When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in accordance with undertaking in the German reply of yesterday, he asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had not arrived in Berlin by midnight.
4. I observed that to treat matter in this way meant that request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on 30th August constituted, in fact, an ultimatum in spite of what he and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he denied, saying that idea of an ultimatum was figment of my imagination. Why then I asked could he not adopt normal procedure and give me copy of proposals and ask Polish Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr Hitler had summoned me a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to Polish Government? In the most violent terms Herr von Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted that if Polish Ambassador asked him for interview it might be different. I said that I would naturally inform my Government so at once. Whereupon he said while those were his personal views he would bring all that I had said to Herr Hitler's notice. It was for Chancellor to decide.
5. We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Herr von Ribbentrop's whole demeanour during an unpleasant interview was aping Herr Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against Polish mobilisation, but I retorted that it was hardly surprising since Germany had also mobilised as Herr Hitler himself had admitted to me yesterday.
|Brit. Botschafter Henderson 1938-1940|
Natürlich darf in diesem revisionistischen Gesamtkonstrukt auch die polnische Teilmobilmachung von März 1939 nicht fehlen. Sie erklärt sich allerdings problemlos aus der "Zerschlagung der Rest-Tschechei", die in diesem Zeitraum stattfand. Welche Reaktion hätte Polen denn ergreifen sollen, nachdem sein einer Nachbar in einem klar aggressiven, das Völkerrecht und bestehende Verträge brechenden Akt einen anderen Nachbar vollständig zerschlagen hatte? Es musste mobilisieren, lag die Befürchtung doch nahe, bald das nächste Ziel zu sein.
Die Entrüstung und Wut in England ist ebenfalls nur verständlich. Unter Preisgabe des Verbündeten Tschechoslowakei und klarem Bruch des Versailler Vertrags hatte man das Münchner Abkommen zustande gebracht, das Hitler kaum fünf Monate eingehalten hatte. Offensichtlich waren vertragliche Friedenslösungen mit Hitler völlig unmöglich, weil er jeden einzelnen Vertrag brach. Im März 1939 wurde dies absolut klar. Was hätte die Aufgabe des polnischen Korridors Polen gebracht außer einer größeren deutschen Aufmarschzone? Nichts.
|Dt. Außenminister Ribbentrop|
Halifax - unbekannt (CC-BY-SA 3.0)
Henderson - Dorneth (CC-BY-SA 3.0)
Ribbentrop - unbekannt (CC-BY-SA 3.0)